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I.

INTRODUCTION

The alternative minimum tax (AMT) has recently become a cause
celebre because many more taxpayers are now subject to it than
originally envisioned at the time of its enactment in 1969 (and, indeed,
1
than after any of its several modifications over the years). As such, it
∗
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1
According to the Congressional Budget Office, prior to 2000 less than 1% of

835

GOLDBERG.FORMATTED.4.DOC

836

3/28/2005 1:33 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 24:835

has been discussed and criticized in the press and by tax professionals
and academics, most recently in Tax Notes by four former Internal
Revenue Service (Service) commissioners who advocated scrapping it
2
entirely. The American Bar Association expressed similar views in
early 2004 when it recommended that “Congress reduce the federal
tax burdens and compliance costs attributable to the Alternative
3
Minimum Tax on individuals by repealing the individual AMT.” The
AMT was also the subject of a Revenue and Tax Policy Brief by the
4
Congressional Budget Office in April 2004.
The criticism has
questioned the wisdom of the inadvertent expansion of the AMT in
5
coverage, that is, the number of taxpayers who will be subject to it.
This expansion of the AMT’s coverage has largely resulted from the
reduction in rates of the regular tax without a concomitant reduction
6
in rates of the AMT. The focus of the recent discussion of the AMT,
however, has been on a glass half empty instead of on a glass half full.
The recently advocated “reform” of simply scrapping the AMT
would leave the regular tax, with all of its defects, intact, without
mitigation by the AMT. On the other hand, merely modifying the
all taxpayers in any year were subject to the AMT. However, under current law, the
AMT is expected to expand exponentially in the years to come, and it is projected
that the AMT will affect approximately 20% of all taxpayers by 2010. CONG. BUDGET
OFF., REVENUE AND TAX POLICY BRIEF, THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, No. 4
(April 15, 2004) [hereinafter THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX]. For additional
information, see Burman et al., infra note 54 and accompanying text.
2
Allen Kenney, Former Commissioners Say It’s Time to Scrap AMT, 103 TAX
NOTES 1466 (June 21, 2004). Former Service Commissioners Fred Goldberg and
Sheldon Cohen explicitly stated that they recommended eliminating the AMT.
Former commissioners Donald Alexander and Mortimer Caplin appeared with
Goldberg and Cohen.
3
Richard A. Shaw, Report to the House of Delegates, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN.
LAW AND REG. PRAC. 1 (2004), at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/annual/
120.doc.
4
THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, supra note 1. The brief considers the
complexity and projected growth of the AMT, concluding that the AMT imposes
costs on both taxpayers and the economy as a whole, and suggests that “[t]he simplest
way to deal with the growth of the AMT would be to eliminate the alternative tax
entirely.” Id. at 6–7.
5
Other criticisms of the AMT include doubts as to “whether the AMT achieves
its policy objectives, the extreme complexity of the system, its lack of administrability,
[and] the presence of horizontal inequities.” Stewart S. Karlinsky, A Report on
Reforming the Alternative Minimum Tax System, 12 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 139, 149 (1995).
6
Analysts also suggest that another major reason for the expansion of AMT
coverage is the fact that the AMT is not indexed for inflation, while the regular
income brackets are adjusted annually for inflation. THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM
TAX, supra note 1.

GOLDBERG.FORMATTED.4.DOC

2005]

To Praise the AMT or to Bury It

3/28/2005 1:33 PM

837

AMT would leave us with a dual system, with all of its needless
complication. These are not the only choices, however. A fairer and
better income tax could be achieved by eliminating the dual system
and incorporating the core principles of the current AMT into the
7
income tax.
In actuality, the current tax system is not a pure income tax but
rather is more accurately characterized as a hybrid of an income tax
8
and a consumption tax. Under this view, a fairer and better tax
system also can be achieved by eliminating the dual system but
incorporating most but not all of the core principles of the current
AMT into the basic tax system. Specifically, the business and
investment provisions of the current AMT would be abandoned. This
idea is explored in greater detail later in this article.
Regardless of whether the goal is to refine the tax system into a
better income tax, or into a better income tax-consumption tax hybrid,
principles of the AMT should be preserved in the basic system. To
simply throw out the AMT without at least saving some of the
provisions that reflect its core principles would represent a significant
step backwards in tax reform. Ultimately, however, determining
which of the AMT’s provisions reflect core principles in the tax system
depends upon the nature of the tax system that is desired — an
income tax or an income tax-consumption tax hybrid.
The analysis in this Article begins in Part II by briefly reviewing
the history, goals, and operation of the AMT. Part III then explains
why the AMT has suddenly risen to the prominence it now has. Part
IV evaluates the AMT by dissecting it into its core principles and
discussing each of those principles, with special attention given to the
business and investment tax provisions of the current AMT. Part V
provides a recommendation to incorporate all but the business and
investment principles of the AMT into the regular tax and suggests
that pursuing that recommendation will achieve a fairer and better tax
system than simply eliminating the AMT, as has been proposed.

7

Other academics agree that one of the best solutions would be to “[r]epeal the
corporate and individual AMT system and incorporate the desired provisions and
limitations [of the AMT] directly into the regular tax system,” which would have the
result of retaining the benefits of the AMT without the unnecessary complexity of the
dual system. Karlinsky, supra note 5, at 151.
8
See Daniel S. Goldberg, The U.S. Consumption Tax: Evolution, Not
Revolution, 57 TAX LAW. 1 (2003).
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II. THE AMT — AN OVERVIEW
The AMT was originally enacted in 1969 to ensure that those
taxpayers with substantial economic income who made use of special
“tax shelter” preferences like accelerated depreciation, depletion, and
9
other special tax incentive deductions in order to reduce or to
eliminate their regular tax liability would be required to pay at least
10
some minimum amount of tax. So was born the AMT, with the
stigma of tax abuser attached to those who fell within it.
In its first incarnation, the AMT was an “add-on” minimum tax;
its structure provided that certain tax preferences (which included
preferentially taxed long-term capital gains), after reduction by an
exemption amount, were subject to a separate surcharge which was
11
payable in addition to the regular tax.
The surcharge tax rate,
originally 10%, was increased to 15% in 1976, at which time new
preferences were added, including one for a portion of some
taxpayers’ itemized deductions, and the exemption amount was
12
reduced. In 1978, Congress introduced an alternative minimum tax
for taxpayers other than corporations to supplement the add-on
13
version, into which it moved the preference for capital gains. In
1982, the alternative minimum tax replaced the add-on minimum tax
14
entirely for taxpayers other than corporations.
The 1986 Tax
15
Reform Act expanded the potential tax base to all taxpayers and
replaced a three tier rate structure with a single 21% rate for a
16
taxpayer other than a corporation, which was increased in 1991 to

9

Over the years, this list (which covers both items of “tax preference” under
section 57 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and adjustments under section 56)
was expanded as new tax incentive provisions were enacted to include other
preferences such as the spread between the value and cost of stock obtained through
exercise of an incentive stock option (section 56(b)(3)), interest on private activity
state or municipal bonds (section 57(a)(5)), and others. See generally I.R.C. §§ 56, 57.
10
See 4 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 114.1.1, at 111-89 (2d ed. 1992).
11
Id. at 111-89 to 111-90. Hence, the original AMT was a tax imposed in
addition to regular tax liability, unlike today’s variety, which is imposed in lieu of the
regular tax for those subject to it. Id.
12
Id. at 111-90.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 111-90 to 111-91.
15
Id. at 111-91.
16
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2321
(1986).

GOLDBERG.FORMATTED.4.DOC

2005]

To Praise the AMT or to Bury It

3/28/2005 1:33 PM

839

17

24% and modified again in 1994 as a result of the tax legislation of
18
1993 to a two-tier rate structure with rates of 26% and 28%.
The original purposes for enacting a minimum tax of ensuring a
tax system that was fair and, perhaps more importantly, was perceived
19
as fair, remain essentially its general purposes today. The nature of
the tax, however, and means of accomplishing its purposes have
undergone varied and inconsistent thinking during the long history of
the AMT. At times, as in 1969, the AMT appeared to be most
concerned with high-income people who used tax preferences to avoid
20
paying any income tax. This theme reappeared during the various
21
modifications of the AMT, including 1986, but at times has expanded
into an attempt at base broadening to be applicable to all individuals,
regardless of their success at eliminating their tax liability completely
22
under the regular tax.
The leading commentators on the AMT
acknowledge this schizophrenia in the objectives of the AMT, but find
justification for an AMT, although not necessarily the present
17

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11,102,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388–406 (1990).
18
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,202, 107
Stat. 312, 461–62 (1993) (codified at I.R.C. § 55(b)(1)(A)).
19
See THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, supra note 1; 4 BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 10, at 111-89.
20
“In 1966, 154 individuals with adjusted gross incomes exceeding $200,000
succeeded in entirely eliminating any income tax liability by extensive use of
allowances authorized by the Code. . . .” 4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, at 11188. The ability of high income individuals to evade tax through means of legal
exemptions was perceived as unfair, and a major threat to taxpayer morale. Id. at
111-89. The Senate Finance Committee addressed the issue, acknowledging that loss
of taxpayer morale could threaten the government’s ability to collect necessary
revenues, but fearing that repeal of tax allowances would create economic
dislocations. Id. As a compromise, a minimum tax on tax preferences was enacted in
1969. Id.
21
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 432–33 (Joint Comm. Print
1987).
22
Id. at 430–32 (listing “tax preference items that were added to the adjusted
gross income base”). When the alternative version of the AMT replaced the add-on
version entirely for individuals in 1982, it was expressly stated by the Joint Committee
that “[t]he only deductions allowed, other than costs of producing income, are for
important personal or unavoidable expenditures (housing interest, medical expenses
and casualty losses) or for charitable contributions, the deduction of which is already
limited to a percentage of adjusted gross income.” STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at 17–18 (Joint Comm.
Print 1982).
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incarnation, as a means of balancing these objectives with Congress’s
desire to use the income tax to encourage investments or other
23
The balancing of these
activities deemed desirable for society.
competing goals has not been easy, as the unstable history of the
AMT demonstrates.
The current AMT is a tax system that runs parallel to the regular
tax system. The AMT uses a broader base than the regular tax, called
24
alternative minimum taxable income (AMTI); it starts with the
concept of gross income, but does not allow deductions for various
25
expenditures for which deductions are allowed under the regular tax
and requires inclusion for some receipts that are excluded from
26
income under the regular tax. The calculation provides a subtraction
for an exemption amount, which subtraction has the effect of allowing
27
an amount of AMTI to not be subject to AMT. The resulting AMTI
is subjected to a virtually flat rate of tax at the nominal rates of 26%
28
and 28%.
Importantly, the exemption amount is phased out for
29
higher income individuals. As a result, the flat rate is somewhat

23

Michael J. Graetz & Emil M. Sunley, Minimum Taxes and Comprehensive
Tax Reform, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOMECONSUMPTION TAX 385, 387–88 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988).
24
4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, at 111-92.
25
See generally I.R.C. § 57.
26
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 57(a)(5) (requiring inclusion of interest on private activity
state or municipal bonds, which is exempt under the regular tax). The actual
computation on the tax return, in simplified form, starts with regular taxable income,
adds back (or subtracts, as the case may be) adjustments under sections 56 and 58,
and adds back items of tax preference under section 57. I.R.C. § 55(b)(2).
27
See I.R.C. § 55(d).
28
See I.R.C. § 55(b)(1) (applying the 26% rate to the first $175,000 of AMTI
and the 28% rate to amounts in excess of $175,000). But see I.R.C. § 55(d) (giving
exemption amounts). A lower tax rate is applied to net capital gain, however. I.R.C.
§ 55(b)(3).
29
See I.R.C. § 55(d) (exempting the first $58,000 from AMTI for a married
couple filing a joint return or a surviving spouse, $40,250 for an unmarried individual,
and $29,000 for a married individual filing separately). These amounts are scheduled
to decrease in future years to $45,000 for a married couple filing a joint return or a
surviving spouse and $33,750 for an unmarried individual, although this decrease was
recently delayed under the Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, which extended
the higher exemption amounts through 2005. Working Families Tax Relief Act of
2004, Pub. L. 108-311, § 103, 118 Stat. 1166 (2004). These exemption amounts are
phased out for higher income taxpayers, that is, married, joint-filing taxpayers (or a
surviving spouse taxpayer) whose income exceeds $150,000 ($75,000 for married
individuals filing separately) and $112,500 for an unmarried individual, at the rate of
25% of the taxpayer’s AMTI in excess of those amounts. I.R.C. § 55(d)(3).
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illusory, because the phase-out of the exemption amount has the
effect of creating additional marginal AMT brackets of 32.5% and
30
35%. Computationally on the tax return, the AMT tax rates of 26%
and 28% are applied to AMTI and the regular tax is subtracted to
31
arrive at the AMT “additional tax.”
For everyday, non-tax sheltered individuals under the current
AMT, the most significant inclusions in the alternative minimum
taxable income computation that are deductible under the regular
income tax computation (technically called “adjustments”) are (1) the
taxes deductible on schedule A (state income tax, real estate tax,
32
33
etc.), (2) interest on home equity indebtedness, (3) miscellaneous
34
itemized deductions that survive the 2% floor under the regular tax,
35
and (4) the deduction for personal and dependency exemptions.
Other individual adjustments, such as the standard deduction, which is
36
37
disallowed under the AMT but permitted under the regular tax,
and a lesser medical expense deduction available under the AMT than
38
39
under the regular tax, can trigger an AMT liability.
These

30

See Leonard E. Burman, An Analysis of the 2004 House Tax Cuts, 103 TAX
NOTES 1635, 1638 n.3 (June 28, 2004).
31
I.R.C. § 55(a). A subtraction is permitted for certain credits under the AMT
as well. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 59.
32
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii). State and local taxes and real property taxes, even
though involuntary once incurred, result from the personal choice of where the
taxpayer chooses to live and the purchase of state and local government services that
the choice reflects. These taxes purchase education services, sanitation services,
police and fire protection in everyday (as opposed to business) life, all of which would
be classified as personal consumption. Indeed, these are purchased by tenants with
non-deductible after-tax dollars as part of their rent.
33
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(C)(i). Home equity indebtedness interest represents an
even stronger example of a deductible personal living expense under the regular tax,
because the interest is generally regarded as an additional cost of consuming the
personal benefit purchased with the loan proceeds. Under the regular tax, it
represents a carve-out from otherwise nondeductible personal interest. I.R.C.
§ 163(h)(2)(D), (h)(3). If the indebtedness proceeds can be traced to a profit-seeking
activity, however, the interest would be treated as an expense of that activity and
deductible, subject to the limits that may be applicable to that activity, such as the
limit on deductibility of investment interest and the passive activity loss limitations.
I.R.C. §§ 163(d), 469(h).
34
See I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (disallowing all miscellaneous itemized
deductions).
35
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(E).
36
Id.
37
I.R.C. § 63(b).
38
Section 213(a) permits a deduction for medical expenses in excess of 7.5% of
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differences between the AMT and the regular tax have nothing to do
40
with tax shelters.
There are several other adjustments and preferences, generally
designed to eliminate business and investment tax incentive provisions
41
from the AMTI computation.
These provisions in the AMT
adjusted gross income while section 56(b)(1)(B) only permits a deduction for medical
expenses in excess of 10% of adjusted gross income. I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(1)(B), 213(a).
39
Additionally, interest on any specified private activity bond, and any
deduction allowed under section 57(a)(5)(A) (tax exempt interest for “specified
private activity bonds reduced by any deduction . . . .which would have been
allowable if such interest were includable in gross income”) is treated as includable in
gross income. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(C)(iii).
40
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 22, (expressing the view
that these expenditures are regarded as personal but not “unavoidable”).
41
Additional adjustments in the AMT that serve to reduce a taxpayer’s
deductions include:
(1) Different treatment of depreciation deductions, resulting in a smaller
deduction under section 56(a)(1);
(2) Mining exploration and development costs are not deductible in the
year incurred, but are amortized according to specific schedules under
section 56(a)(2);
(3) Companies must compute a special AMT net operating loss to take a
net operating loss deduction under section 56(a)(4);
(4) Costs of pollution control facilities must be deducted under the AMT’s
alternative depreciation system or by using the straight-line depreciation
method, rather than as amortized deductions under section 56(a)(5);
(5) Circulation expenditures and research and developmental expenditures
must be deducted over time via amortization deductions rather than as
same-year deductions under section 56(b)(2);
(6) Certain corporate deductions for capital construction funds and
insurance companies are disallowed under section 56(c)(2), (3);
(7) Tax shelter farm activity losses are disallowed under section 58(a);
(8) Different formulae for computing disallowed passive losses under
section 58(b);
(9) Different treatment of long term contracts under section 56(a)(3);
(10) Gains and losses from the sale or exchange of property are treated
differently, with the adjusted basis of an asset being determined based on
the amount of deductions permitted for AMTI purposes under section
56(a)(6);
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sometimes have the effect of disallowing or deferring deductions for
certain business and investment expenditures in the AMT that are
deductible under the regular tax or accelerating income in the AMT.
For example, as an adjustment, an alternative system of depreciation
is used for AMT purposes, and it prescribes a slower recovery rate
42
than under the regular tax.
Similarly, individuals who exercise
incentive stock options (ISOs) can be subject to AMT coverage
because the bargain purchase element (value of the stock less the
43
exercise price) is an adjustment under the AMT, although it is non44
taxable under the regular tax. As a result, during the dot-com boom,
45
ISOs were a significant trigger for the AMT.
Most of the differences relating to business and investment are in
the nature of timing benefits in the regular tax that are curtailed in the
46
AMT rather than items that are deductible under the regular tax but
47
are simply not deductible under the AMT. The timing adjustments,
to the extent that they create an AMT liability, also create an AMT
48
credit available to offset future regular income tax.
But the

(11) The alcohol fuel credit is not applicable (i.e. alcohol fuel credit may
not be used to offset the AMT liability) under section 56(a)(7);
(12) Incentive stock options are treated differently in that ISOs are
essentially treated as NSOs for AMT purposes under section 56(b)(3).
James E. Maule & Lisa M. Starczewski, 503-2nd T.M., Deductions: Overview and
Conceptual Aspects A-27 (2000); Lisa M. Starczewski, 587 T.M., Noncorporate
Alternative Minimum Tax A-5 (2002).
42
I.R.C. § 56(a)(1). Also, the accelerated portion of depreciation is added back
in the AMTI computation, as a preference, on property placed in service before 1987.
I.R.C. § 57(a)(6).
43
I.R.C. § 56(b)(3).
44
I.R.C. §§ 421, 422.
45
The exercise of an ISO is not recognized as income to the employee. I.R.C.
§ 421(a). Under the AMT, however, ISOs are treated as a tax preference item, and
thus the bargain element of the exercise of each stock is included in the AMT base.
I.R.C. § 56(b)(3). Hence, taxpayers may be subject to “unrealized paper profits” on
their ISOs under the AMT, even if there has been no event of realization under the
Code. Agnes Gesiko, The Taxation of Phantom Profits under the Alternative
Minimum Tax, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 443, 444 (2002).
46
See, e.g, I.R.C. § 56(a)(1) (dealing with depreciation).
47
Even the deduction for research and experimental expenses under section
174, for which no deduction is allowed under the AMT for those individual taxpayers
who do not materially participate in the activity within the meaning of section 469(h),
is in the nature of a timing benefit, because the AMT allows amortization of the
capitalized research expense over ten years. I.R.C. § 56(b)(2)(A)(ii), (D).
48
See I.R.C. § 53.
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adjustments for non-business, non-investment expenses enumerated
earlier, which involve more than mere timing, create extra tax without
49
any future credit or offset.
III. THE CURRENT RUSH TOWARDS REFORM OF THE AMT
As long as the AMT was relegated to a backwater of the tax law,
applicable to only a relatively small number of individual taxpayers
who made use of tax shelter preferences, Congress viewed it as
appropriate to re-compute those individual taxpayers’ tax liability
50
under an alternative computation by ignoring those preferences.
The alternative computations for those particular taxpayers also
required them to include in the alternative tax base the itemized
deductions available under the regular tax which are not available
under the AMT, without which the timing preferences that created
51
the tax shelter benefits may not have caused an AMT liability.
These two very different components of the income tax are
inextricably tied together in the AMT.
Through most of its history, while the AMT added to the
complexity of the tax system because it required a dual computation
of tax, its scope was so limited that it did not apply to most taxpayers
52
and therefore could be ignored. Indeed, many taxpayers had never
heard of the AMT — that is, until recently.
Under the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003, tax rates were reduced under the regular tax, but AMT rates
53
were not. Thus, when the regular tax rates included brackets of

49

Id. The preference for ISOs is technically in the nature of a timing
preference, because the taxpayer gets a special AMT basis equal to the value of the
acquired stock. Any loss from the subsequent sale of the stock, however, could be
restricted to $3000 per year (plus any AMT capital gains) and therefore could end up
being of limited use.
50
See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
51
See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
52
Despite the fact that most taxpayers were not in fact subject to the AMT,
however, some have criticized the AMT for requiring all taxpayers to needlessly
compute a second tax. See, e.g., Kendyl K. Monroe, The Alternative Minimum Tax
from a Practical Perspective: Its Role in the Income Tax Structure Under Current Law,
and Its Possible Role in Future Deficit Reduction Legislation, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 341. According to Monroe, “[t]he imposition of unnecessary and meaningless
reporting and compliance burdens may in fact be eroding confidence in the system.”
Id. at 342.
53
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-27,
§§ 105, 106, 117 Stat. 752, 755 (2003). The exemption amount was increased,
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28%, 31%, 36%, and 39.6%, while the AMT rates stood at 26% and
28% and there was a substantial AMT exemption amount, the AMT
54
had little applicability to most taxpayers. The reduction in the top
regular rates to 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35% together with an expansion
of the income subject to the lower brackets, without any proportional
reduction in AMT rates, will cause the AMT to be applicable to many
55
additional taxpayers. This rate reduction under the regular tax alone
caused more taxpayers to be covered under the AMT because the
spread between the higher rates under the regular tax and AMT rates
narrowed significantly.
Interestingly, several years before, in 1993, the regular tax rates
56
were increased with the creation of the 36% and 39.6% brackets. At
that time, the AMT rates were increased from 24% (they had stood at
57
21% from 1986 to 1991) to 26% and 28%. Thus, the roll-back of the
regular rates in 2001 without a corresponding roll-back of AMT rates
created the situation of expanding AMT applicability, which would
not have existed had the 1991 and 1993 AMT rate increases not
58
occurred.
In addition, regular tax rate brackets, exemptions, deductions
such as for personal exemptions, and credits are typically indexed for

however. Id. § 105, 117 Stat. at 755.
54
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, §§ 13,201,
13,202, 107 Stat. 312, 458, 461–62 (1993) (lowering regular tax rates while leaving
AMT rates unchanged). The effects of this change are described in Leonard E.
Burman et. al., The AMT: Projections and Problems, 100 TAX NOTES 105 (July 7,
2003).
55
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
§§ 104–106, 117 Stat. 752, 754–755 (2003). It is estimated that the applicability of the
AMT to taxpayers will significantly increase in the future. Burman et. al., supra note
54. A 2003 report in Tax Analysts estimates that households with income less than
$100,000 will account for 52% of AMT taxpayers by 2010 (compared to 9% in 2003),
accounting for 23% of total AMT revenue (compared with 5% in 2003). Id.
56
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,202, 107
Stat. 312, 461 (1993).
57
From 1986 to 1991, the AMT rate was 21% for a taxpayer other than a
corporation. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2320–21
(1986). From 1991 to 1993, the AMT tax rate was 24%. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11,102, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388–406
(1990). In 1993, the AMT rates were increased to 26% and 28%. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,203, 107 Stat. 312, 461–62 (1993).
58
It is estimated that the 2001 tax cut will increase the number of taxpayers
subject to the AMT from fourteen million to thirty-three million in the year 2010.
Burman et al., supra note 54, at 105.
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inflation, whereas AMT rates and brackets are not. This difference
will continue to draw more taxpayers into the AMT.
The expanded role of the AMT in the tax system because of the
expanded number of taxpayers who will be subject to it adds a
significant layer of complexity to the system in terms of compliance
and administration. The income tax is already under fire from critics
60
because it cannot support its own weight. For the income tax to
survive replacement by a simpler, consumption type tax, as has been
proposed by many academics and legislators, it must be reformed into
a much less complex system, at least as it applies to the mass of
individual taxpayers.
It is not only the number of taxpayers who are becoming subject
to the AMT that is causing concern among taxpayers, but the effect on
those taxpayers of being taxed under the AMT regime instead of the
61
regular tax. Indeed, advocates of a progressive income tax may be
alarmed by the increasing importance of the AMT in the overall
income tax system because, when it applies (and it will apply
frequently unless substantially modified or eliminated by future
legislation), the AMT replaces a progressive rate system with an
62
almost flat rate one and relies for what progressivity it contains
largely on the phase-out of the exclusion amount for upper income
63
taxpayers. It also abandons any standard deduction or deduction for
64
personal exemptions, both of which tend to favor lower income
65
taxpayers. The standard deduction favors lower income taxpayers
because those taxpayers tend not to have sufficient income or wealth
to cause their itemized deductions to exceed the standard deduction.
Itemized deductions, as a practical matter, are based on income or
59

See THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, supra note 1.
Many academic and legislative proposals have been made to replace the
income tax with a consumption tax. See, e.g., William Andrews, A Consumption-Type
of Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
61
See Burman et al., supra note 54.
62
See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
63
See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
64
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(E).
65
The AMT’s failure to grant personal deductions has been castigated by some
for creating marriage and child penalties. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman et al., The
Individual AMT: Problems and Potential Solutions (Sept. 18, 2002), available at
www.taxpolicycenter.org. This 2002 Tax Analysts report stated that unless the AMT
is reformed, couples will be more than twenty times as likely as singles to be subject to
the AMT in 2010 and, due to the AMT’s lack of deductions for dependents, “[a]mong
married couples with two or more children and income between $75,000 and $500,000,
the AMT participation rate will approach 100 percent.” Id. at 6–7, tbl. 4.
60
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wealth, such as state income tax, home mortgage interest, and real
68
estate taxes. Also, personal exemptions are available for lower and
middle income taxpayers, whereas they are phased out for upper
69
income taxpayers.
On the other hand, the AMT eliminates
70
deductions for interest on home equity indebtedness and state and
71
local taxes, which, under a progressive rate structure, represent
upside down subsidies favoring high bracket taxpayers more than low
72
bracket taxpayers.
IV. THE AMT — AN EVALUATION
The best way to evaluate the AMT is to break it down into its
core concepts or provisions and analyze each of them separately to
determine its desirability. They are (1) a dual system of computation
of income and tax; (2) a large exemption amount below which no
AMT is imposed; (3) a flat or nearly flat tax rate structure; (4) a broad
base upon which the tax is imposed, which eliminates many of the
deductions for personal consumption expenses that have been
deductible as itemized deductions for many years; (5) a determination
of the tax burden that is independent of the number of dependents the
taxpayer has, particularly with respect to those taxpayers whose
income exceeds the exemption amount; and (6) the elimination or
curtailment of deductions that do not measure net income but rather
are designed to provide incentives for business or investment activities
or expenditures.
A. The Dual System
There are many good things about the AMT from the point of
view of income tax reformers who advocate a more comprehensive
tax base and one free of incentive provisions. The regular tax allows
deductions for some personal consumption expenses and special
accelerated deductions or credits for business and investment

66

I.R.C. § 164(a)(3).
I.R.C. § 163(a), (h)(2)(D).
68
I.R.C. § 164(a)(1).
69
I.R.C. § 151(d)(3).
70
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(C)(i).
71
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(ii).
72
For a discussion of this topic, see STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL,
TAX EXPENDITURES 71–82 (1985).
67
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expenses that Congress desires to encourage. A purist’s income tax
would not allow most if not all of the personal consumption expenses
and would force deferral of the incentive portions of the business and
74
investment deductions and elimination of the credits.
The AMT
compromise approach is that all of these expenses are eliminated as
deductions and credits are not allowed, but only for those taxpayers
75
who make too great of a use of them. It is this compromise that
leads to the dual system and the resulting complexity that many now
desire to abandon because a second computation of the tax base, with
various modifications, is required to compute an alternative tax in
order to determine who is over-using these tax benefits.
Moreover, separate recordkeeping is required for such items as
regular tax basis, AMT basis, regular tax passive activity loss
76
carryovers, and AMT passive activity loss carryovers.
This extra
recordkeeping adds to both the taxpayers’ compliance costs and the
Internal Revenue Service’s administrative audit burdens and costs. It
also invites taxpayers to fail to comply, which likely results in lost
77
revenues.
The reality of the current AMT stands in stark contrast to the
ideals of the AMT. Tax reformers for years have focused on
broadening the base of the income tax and at the same time, in what
appeared to be a complementary objective, ensuring that all those
taxpayers with high income will pay some tax. The former objective
73

See id. at 1–6 (discussing the use of tools such as deductions to further
congressional policy objectives).
74
Some “purists” deride the AMT for not going far enough. See Kerry Sean
Bucklin, Comment, The Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals: Present Problems
and Future Possibilities, 63 WASH. L. REV. 103 (1988). Bucklin states that the AMT
fails to tax all economic income and suggests that it should be reformed to do so.
Bucklin concludes that this reformed AMT should then replace the regular tax
system. Id. at 111.
75
Congress’s goal in enacting the AMT was to achieve the dual goals of: (1)
retaining tax incentives while (2) ensuring that some taxpayers did not overuse the
incentives. 4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10, at 111-89. A derision of the tax
system for not taxing all economic income ignores the fact that Congress has long
used the tax system to encourage taxpayers to engage in certain activities. Deborah
M. Weiss, Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1949, 1950 (1994).
Deborah Weiss points out that “[t]he principle mechanism for tax policy is the tax
incentive. . . . Tax incentives, however, create opportunities for high-income taxpayers
to reduce their taxes by holding their wealth in tax-preferred items.” Id.
76
See Bucklin, supra note 74, at 111.
77
An additional cost created by the inefficiencies of the dual system is that it
impairs taxpayers’ ability to make informed investment decisions regarding tax costs.
See Bucklin, supra note 74, at 111.

GOLDBERG.FORMATTED.4.DOC

2005]

To Praise the AMT or to Bury It

3/28/2005 1:33 PM

849

could have been accomplished in the regular tax simply by eliminating
deductions for expenditures that would properly be viewed as
personal in nature rather than profit seeking and by limiting tax
incentive provisions which lend themselves to tax sheltering. Tax
reformers’ ideal of a “comprehensive income tax base” would then be
achieved. In that way, a tax law encompassing a broader base would
better accomplish the taxation of “net income” as one might define
that term under the Haig-Simons definition of income, that is, the sum
of a taxpayer’s personal consumption and increase in wealth during
78
the year. This definition is the standard used by most academics as
the idealized income tax base, against which the income tax system’s
79
actual measurement of income should be compared.
Congress, however, has been unwilling to broaden the income
base for everyone or eliminate tax incentives for all business taxpayers
80
and investors. Thus, the AMT was enacted and modified perpetually
to strike a compromise — a middle ground. The AMT, from the time
of its inception in 1969, has represented an attempt to broaden the
base of the income tax by concentrating on only a small percentage of
taxpayers — those who made substantial use of various tax incentives
81
in the tax law to reduce or eliminate their taxes. The AMT was
designed to limit the permissible reduction so that everybody paid
82
some tax on their income. It did this by constructing a shadow, or
alternative, system that was much simpler and more comprehensive
83
than the regular tax. Thus, some taxpayers lived by the regular tax
rules, but others were subject to the AMT rules, which could be quite
84
different than the regular tax rules. Furthermore, some taxpayers
could slip from one set of rules to another, depending upon
expenditures made or transactions entered into by the taxpayer during
the year.
The AMT seeks an important reform goal, but does not go far
enough. Under fundamental income tax reform, the approach to tax
incentive provisions and personal consumption deductions adopted by
the AMT is the correct one and should establish the rule for the entire
income tax system. Most importantly, there should be only one set of
78

Daniel S. Goldberg, E-Tax: Fundamental Tax Reform and the Transition to a
Currency-Free Economy, 20 VA. TAX REV. 1, 43–44 (2000) (citations omitted).
79
Id. at 44.
80
4 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 10.
81
See THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, supra note 1.
82
See id.
83
See id.
84
See id.
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rules, not two, and that set of rules should largely follow those that are
in the current AMT, not the regular tax. Such an approach would
broaden the tax base by eliminating tax incentive subsidies and
include more items of taxpayers’ personal consumption than are
currently included in the regular income tax. To stop short of this
ideal could be practical under certain circumstances, but to draw the
line between taxpayers rather than among provisions based upon how
many of the special rules the taxpayers seek to use elevates
appearance over logic and substance.
B. The Large Exemption Amount
The AMT reflects a policy choice that there should be a large
85
exemption amount, preferably without a phase-out for high income
individuals (although a phase-out could be acceptable if some
progressivity were desired). A large exemption amount eliminates
low income taxpayers from the requirement to pay income tax and
thereby achieves fairer burden sharing by relieving the burden of
those who are likely to have the least amount of resources. A large
exemption amount also achieves substantial simplification in the
system by eliminating the tax filing obligations of low income
taxpayers.
Under the current AMT, however, the exemption amount is only
86
for the AMT computation.
It should be expanded to the entire
income tax in the event the AMT is eliminated.
C. Flat Rate Tax
The AMT uses a flat rate or near flat rate tax bracket structure
87
after the exemption amount has been exceeded. A flat rate certainly
gives the perception of simplicity to “tax civilians” and in many
respects creates simplicity, particularly by reducing income shifting
and planning around income shifting among taxpayers who have
incomes above the exemption amount.
The choice between a flat rate system and a progressive or
88
graduated rate system has been reviewed by many tax scholars. No
85

See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The precise amount of the level of
income at which tax should begin can be determined in the future.
86
I.R.C. § 55(d).
87
See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
88
See, e.g., WALTER J. BLUM & HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE UNEASY CASE FOR
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare
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resolution of the issue will be attempted here, although the flat rate
system was a core principle of the AMT and could be extended to the
entire tax upon elimination of the AMT. While this may appear
reactionary to advocates of a progressive income tax, a flat rate
system apparently appealed to enough legislators on the basis of
simplicity and fairness during the 1986 tax reform proceedings to
89
achieve passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Moreover, a flat
rate system with an exemption amount accomplishes progressivity
with regard to average tax rates, although not marginal tax rates, at
high income levels. Some progressivity of marginal tax rates could be
90
achieved by phasing out the exemption amount, as indicated above,
without doing much damage to the perception of a flat rate tax.
The flat rate aspect of the AMT may be one of the reasons
(besides revenue losses) for the current administration’s reluctance to
91
abandon the AMT. Moreover, as an increasingly greater number of
earners become subject to the AMT, and those earners represent a
disproportionately large amount of revenue collections, the
achievement of a flat rate by the AMT back door may be viewed as
worth the wasteful complexity of the dual computation. In this
scenario, eventually the regular tax would be viewed as the special
computation, largely reserved for low income taxpayers because they
are the only ones entitled to a meaningful exemption amount that is
not phased out.
Such a potential evolution, though perhaps politically expedient
in the short run, should be avoided. Instead, the flat rate principle
should be adopted outright as part of a reformed tax system so as not
to leave a lengthy transition period between the current dual
computation system and the single computation system.
D. Base Broadening
The AMT uses a broad tax base as one of its core principles and
this concept could be extended to the regular tax upon elimination of
the AMT. Of course, the precise areas of base broadening would very

and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905
(1987); Lawrence Zelenak & Kemper Moreland, Can the Graduated Income Tax
Survive Optimal Tax Analysis?, 53 TAX L. REV. 51 (1999).
89
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
90
See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
91
See Lawrence Zelenak, Framing the Distributional Effects of the Bush Tax
Cuts, 105 TAX NOTES 83 (Oct. 4, 2004). Zelenak, however, views the flat tax aspect of
the AMT with disfavor because it lacks sufficient progressivity.
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well be the subject of substantial disagreement. The issues should
really be separated into broadening the base with regard to personal
consumption expenditures and broadening the base with regard to
business and investment expenditures. Only the first is dealt with in
the following discussion.
The current AMT’s solution to base broadening for consumption
expenditures would be a good starting point for reform of the income
92
tax, because it is already a part of congressionally-enacted tax law.
For example, the AMT adjustments for state and local taxes, home
equity interest, medical expenses, and personal exemptions may
93
credibly be argued to be personal consumption expenditures. Under
a comprehensive income or consumption tax system, no deductions
would be allowed for these, which is the current approach of the
94
AMT.
Tax reformers should argue that this should become the
universal rule in the income tax.
In contrast, the AMT treatment of miscellaneous itemized
deductions represents an exception to the treatment that should
obtain under a comprehensive income or consumption tax. The
regular tax has chosen to treat miscellaneous itemized deductions
disadvantageously, in essence as partly personal consumption
expenses, even though they are clearly not. Miscellaneous itemized
deductions include income earning expenses such as unreimbursed
employee business expenses, investment expenses, and legal fees
incurred to secure a damage recovery of amounts not in connection
95
with a trade or business — all properly deductible under a Haig96
Simons-based income tax system or a consumption tax. The regular
tax disallows these expenses up to two percent of a taxpayer’s
97
adjusted gross income. This was done for both simplicity purposes
98
and as a revenue generator. The AMT extends this disallowance
treatment to the entire category of expenses deductible as
99
miscellaneous itemized deductions and thereby causes the AMT tax
base to be unfairly over-inclusive. Reform should allow a full

92

See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
94
See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text.
95
I.R.C. §§ 62, 67, 162, 212.
96
See Goldberg, supra note 78.
97
I.R.C. § 67(a).
98
Robert J. Peroni, Reform in the Use of Phase-Outs and Floors in the Individual
Income Tax System, 91 TAX NOTES 1415, 1418 (May 28, 2001).
99
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
93

GOLDBERG.FORMATTED.4.DOC

2005]

3/28/2005 1:33 PM

To Praise the AMT or to Bury It

deduction for miscellaneous itemized deductions.

853

100

E. Personal Exemptions for Dependents
The current AMT does not allow deductions for personal
exemptions, presumably viewing them as a matter of personal
101
choice. Personal exemptions, however, may be argued to present a
different kind of issue than personal consumption expenditures. They
bear no connection to any income earning expense. As such,
elimination of the deduction for personal exemptions, as under the
AMT, would better conform the tax base to the Haig-Simons base.
On the other hand, one could argue that deductions for personal
exemptions could be retained because they represent part of the
underlying tax rate structure and reflect a determination of reduced
100

Section 162 allows miscellaneous itemized deductions under the regular tax,
but such deductions are disallowed under the AMT. I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(1)(A)(i), 162.
This has created significant problems in recent years, especially regarding contingent
attorney’s fees, because it is perceived as unfair to require taxpayers to include the
entire amount of taxable damages, including the portion paid to or retained by the
attorney as a contingent fee, to be included in gross income. Ilir Mujalovic, Note, Yet
Another Alternative Minimum Tax Disaster: How Recovery of Damages Turns into a
Liability, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 355, 356–57 (2003). This situation has led to
inequitable results, with some taxpayers being subject to tax greatly exceeding the
amount of their take-home award. Id. Another commentator suggests that
“Congress should amend the AMT to allow a deduction for contingent attorney’s fees
characterized as miscellaneous itemized deductions,” presumably as an item
deductible under the AMT, notwithstanding that it is otherwise a miscellaneous
itemized deduction. Darren J. Campbell, Comment, Wiping the Slate Clean: An
Examination of How a Court’s Characterization of Contingent Attorney’s Fees
Implicates the Alternative Minimum Tax and Affects the Taxpayers, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 171, 205 (2001). Congress, however, in its recently passed American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 fixed part of the problem by allowing an above the line
deduction, rather than a miscellaneous itemized deduction, for attorney’s fees and
court costs incurred in connection with an unlawful discrimination claim, and certain
other specified claims. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 108 Pub. L. No. 108-357,
§ 703, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004). As such, the attorney’s fees and costs would be
deductible for AMT purposes, since they would fall outside of the adjustment for
miscellaneous itemized deductions. Congress’s fix, however, was not complete
because it failed to provide the same relief for all attorney’s fees and court costs
incurred to recover taxable damage awards. Id. Moreover, the Supreme Court held
recently that the amount of a litigant’s recovery that is includible in income includes
the amount paid to the litigant’s attorney as a contingent fee. Commissioner v.
Banks, 125 S. Ct. 826 (2005). The AMT treatment of the fee therefore remains
important in cases of taxable damage awards other than those specifically carved out
by the new statute.
101
I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(E).
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burden sharing for families based on the principle that they have a
lesser ability to bear that burden. Neither resolution would be
inconsistent with a comprehensive income tax base.
F. Business and Investment Provisions: Timing of Deductions and
Allowance of Credits
The AMT does not allow taxpayers to use accelerated deductions
102
103
or business tax credits that are permitted under the regular tax,
which are designed to provide incentives for business and investment
expenditures. Thus, the AMT adopts its own depreciation schedules,
disallows some immediate write-offs for expenditures that in theory
should have to be capitalized and depreciated, and does not allow
104
incentive business credits. These provisions in the regular tax have
105
Under a broad based income tax
traditionally led to tax shelters.
that is free from distortions, however, incentives should be eliminated
in order to reduce the opportunity for tax sheltering. Elimination
would also have the effect of reducing the impact of the tax system on
controlling social and economic policy. Under a comprehensive,
broad based income tax, such incentives should be eliminated or
curtailed under the regular tax upon elimination of the AMT. Such an
approach would elevate the fairness objectives of the income tax law,
which seeks to ensure that all taxpayers with economic income pay
some tax, over the desire to encourage business or investment
activities.
On the other hand, due to the desirability of, and pressures for,
economic stimulus and investment incentives at appropriate times,
this area might be intentionally left open to permit the government
flexibility to employ fiscal policy remedies when the health of the
economy requires them. Admittedly, the prospect of retaining
102

See supra note 41 and accompanying text (relating to accelerated deductions);
see also I.R.C. § 38 (relating to business tax credits). Because section 38(c)(1)
prescribes that the credit must not exceed the excess (if any) of the taxpayer’s “net
income tax” over the greater of (a) the taxpayer’s “tentative minimum tax” for the tax
year or (b) 25% of so much of the taxpayer’s “net regular tax liability as exceeds
$25,000”, the effect of the limitation rule of section 38(c)(1) is that in any year that a
taxpayer is subject to the alternative minimum tax, the taxpayer can take no general
business credit. See I.R.C. § 38(c)(1)(A).
103
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168 (relating to accelerated depreciation); see also I.R.C.
§ 38 (relating to the general business credit).
104
See I.R.C. § 56(a)(1); see also supra notes 102 and 103 and accompanying text.
105
See generally David P. Hariton, Sorting out the Tangle of Economic Substance,
52 TAX LAW. 235 (1999).
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business tax incentive provisions raises the specter of tax shelter abuse
and creates a risk that these may gut the base-broadening objective of
the current AMT if they are abused by Congress. Perhaps that risk is
unavoidable as a practical matter, and one can hope that the political
process can hold Congress in check on these matters. In any event,
these provisions either should or should not be included in the tax
system. A dual computation as under the current AMT blunts the
incentive by leaving some taxpayers out of it and creates unwelcome
complexity, as discussed previously.
The foregoing discussion of timing provisions for business and
investment expenditures is framed in traditional income tax terms.
But if the tax system were viewed as a consumption tax instead of an
income tax, or as a hybrid income-consumption tax, then the analysis
of the AMT business timing provisions must proceed differently. In
fact, the current system is really such a hybrid. Its consumption tax
features incorporate both a “cash flow consumed income” type
consumption tax, as well as a “yield exemption” type consumption
106
tax.
As noted above, under the “cash flow consumed income” tax
version of a consumption tax, the individual taxpayer includes all
items of income, both from labor and from capital, in his tax base, and
then subtracts or deducts the portion of that income that he saves or
invests. The resulting amount represents the portion of his income
that he has not saved, (that is, that he has consumed), and is the
107
amount that is subject to tax. In that manner, the consumed income
108
The consumed
tax would levy the tax directly on consumption.
109
income tax is computed and collected at the individual level. Thus,
for example, an individual who saves $10,000 from his $100,000
income for the year would only be taxed on his net of $90,000.
The counterpart to this process for the business taxpayer permits
that taxpayer to deduct currently from gross income any amounts
spent on investments in plant and equipment during the year (in
addition to ordinary operating expenses). Under the income tax, in
general, these expenditures could require capitalization if they create
an asset or benefit extending substantially beyond the year of the
106

See Goldberg, supra note 8 (arguing that the current income tax already
approaches a consumption tax and that the trend is likely to move even further in that
direction).
107
See Andrews, supra note 60, at 1149.
108
See id. Under Andrews’s formulation, a taxpayer would also include
borrowings in his tax base and deduct repayments. Id.
109
See generally id. at 1120.
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110

expenditure.
The analysis of a consumption tax often focuses on the cash flow
consumed income tax because it can be collected, mechanically, in a
manner similar to the current income tax. It therefore is most easily
compared and contrasted to the income tax.
A similar end result — taxing consumption, not savings — can be
achieved by allowing income from capital to be exempt from income
tax, that is, by employing a “yield exemption” system. For example,
suppose instead of permitting a deduction for a taxpayer’s savings or
investment during the year, the tax law permitted the returns from
that investment to be exempt from tax instead. Under certain specific
111
circumstances (involving (1) tax rates are uniform over time, (2) the
deduction produces an immediate tax saving determined by that
uniform rate, and (3) the tax savings from the deduction will yield the
112
same return as the rest of the investment), this variation will
113
replicate the effect of allowing the deduction.

110

I.R.C. § 263; Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1994).
This assures that the tax saved by virtue of the deduction will be collected at
the same rate upon sale of the asset.
112
This equates a yield exemption investment with an immediately deductible
investment of the same amount. If the equivalence is instead based on the amount of
after-tax investment, then the assumption is not necessary.
113
Goldberg, supra note 8, at 2–3. To illustrate the equality of these two forms of
consumption tax (cash flow consumed income and yield exemption) under the
foregoing assumptions,
111

consider a taxpayer’s investment of $100 in year 1 for which a deduction
would be allowed under the cash flow consumption tax model. Suppose
that the taxpayer’s tax rate is 30% and the item will generate the
cumulative amount of $200 in year 3, which will be withdrawn for
consumption and therefore taxable. As a result, a post-tax investment of
$70 (the result of a pre-tax investment of $100 for which a deduction is
allowed) will result in pre-tax income of $200, which when withdrawn and
taxed will amount to post-tax income of $140 ($200 – $60 (tax)). Under
these facts, the taxpayer’s net after-tax profit is $70 ($140 (post tax return)
– $70 (post-tax investment)) and rate of profit for the relevant years is
100%.
Similarly, if no deduction is allowed for the investment, but the resulting
income is exempted from tax, as under the yield exemption model, then
under these same assumptions, the taxpayer’s rate of profit will be the same
as the foregoing illustration.
Specifically, the $100 nondeductible
expenditure represents a post tax investment of $100. In year 3, it
generates the cumulative amount of $200, which is exempt from tax. Under
these facts, the taxpayer’s net after-tax profit is $100 and rate of profit for
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114

The consumption tax features of the current tax law include:
(1) The deferral of gain subject to tax until there is an event of
realization. The tax law’s realization requirement constitutes a yield
exemption type consumption tax treatment because appreciated
115
investments are not subject to tax until they are sold. Moreover, any
tax on the appreciation would be eliminated entirely under section
116
1014 if the taxpayer dies with the property.
The realization
requirement of the income tax, capital gains preference, and steppedup basis at death all combine to create a yield exemption or partial
117
yield exemption regime;
(2) The favorable treatment of retirement plans. Generally,
retirement plans constitute a consumed income type consumption tax
because funds are deposited into the plans tax free and are taxed only
when withdrawn, although some plans, such as the Roth IRA,
exemplify a yield exemption type consumption tax because funds are
118
taxed up front but are tax exempt when withdrawn;
the relevant years is $100%.
In these two examples, the taxpayer’s rate of profit is the same, namely
100%. Further, the taxpayer in the first example could duplicate the
second taxpayer’s amount of profit by investing the after-tax contribution
amount of $100 instead of only $70. For example, suppose the taxpayer
invested $142.86 before tax and therefore $100 (142.86 – $42.86 (tax
savings)) after tax to generate $285.72 before tax, representing $200 after
tax amount (285.72 – $85.72 (tax)), and $100 after-tax profit from the $100
after-tax amount invested. The taxpayer’s rate of profit remains at 100%,
and his after-tax profit amount is $100 ($200 – $100).
Id. at 3–4 (citation omitted).
114
See id. at 8–20.
115
Id. at 9.
116
I.R.C. § 1014.
117
Under a yield exemption type consumption tax, gains from investments are
untaxed. Goldberg, supra note 8, at 9. The realization requirement in the current
“income tax” system constitutes a yield exemption type consumption tax, because
appreciated investments are not subjected to tax until they are sold. Id. Hence, the
taxpayer gains the benefits of tax deferral until the property has been sold
(consumed). The yield exemption properties of the realization requirement are even
more pronounced when the realization requirement is coupled with section 1014,
which provides for stepped up basis at death. Id. In this case, the gains from the
appreciated property are never taxed. Id.
118
Under the cash flow consumed income type consumption tax, the portion of
the taxpayer’s saved income is subtracted from his tax base. Goldberg, supra note 8,
at 2. Most retirement plans (including traditional IRAs, section 401(k) plans, etc.)
may be classified under the cash flow consumed income type consumption tax
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(3) Yield exemption treatment for Section 529 Education Plans.
Section 529 Education Plans are treated under a yield exemption
regime because funds invested in the plans are subject to tax, but any
119
withdrawn yield is tax exempt;
(4) Home Ownership Benefits.
Home ownership exempts
imputed income from the home and (in most cases) gain from its sale,
both of which are yield exemption treatments because only the initial
120
investment is subject to tax;
(5) Business Tax Incentives. Business tax incentives typically
employ the consumed income model, as under section 179 which
allows the taxpayer to defer tax until the property is consumed, or
121
partly that model, as under accelerated depreciation.
Thus, the significant tax advantages enjoyed by those taxpayers
who derive income from capital, such as the deferral of gain subject to
tax until realization, advantageous treatment of contributions to
because deductions and exclusions are available for the funds initially invested, and as
long as the funds remain in the plan, they accrue tax free interest and appreciation.
Id. at 12. When the funds are taken out, they are taxed. Id. at 13. The Roth IRA
constitutes a yield exemption type consumption tax because the funds put into the
Roth IRA are fully taxable, but the gains are exempt from tax when taken out
(consumed). Id. Whether under a cash flow consumed income or a yield exemption
type scheme, however, retirement funds are clearly subject to a consumption tax, not
the income tax. Id. at 14.
119
Section 529 Education plans allow states to create “qualified tuition
programs” under which funds invested in the plans are subject to federal income tax,
but the gains are exempt from tax when distributed and used to pay qualified tuition
expenses. I.R.C. § 529. This constitutes a yield exemption type consumption tax at
the federal level, similar to the treatment of the Roth IRA. Goldberg, supra note 8,
at 15–17.
120
The non-taxability of imputed income of a home constitutes a yield exemption
type tax benefit, because although the funds used to purchase the home are subject to
tax, the benefit of the use of the home (the rental value) is not. Goldberg, supra note
8, at 17. Similarly, the excludability from income of all or most of the gain on the sale
of the home (up to the statutory limit of $500,000) constitutes a yield exemption type
consumption tax, because the gains realized on the home (due to appreciation) are
exempted from tax. Id.
121
Section 179 provides that “[a] taxpayer may elect to treat the cost of any
section 179 property as an expense which is not chargeable to capital account.” I.R.C.
§ 179(a). Hence, the taxpayer may elect to immediately expense tangible personal
property (such as equipment) used by the taxpayer in his trade or business, thus
completely deferring taxes until “consumed.” Goldberg, supra note 8, at 18–20.
Accelerated depreciation schedules, which allow for depreciation deductions on
equipment more quickly than the rate at which the item is likely to get used up
economically, employ a partial consumed income type model, because some, though
not all, of the taxes are deferred until the item has been “consumed.” Id.
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retirement plans and deferral of inclusion of earnings from those
retirement plans, the special low tax rates applicable to dividends and
long-term capital gains and the special benefits associated with
homeownership and funded education plans that exist under the
current income tax system, all reflect consumption tax features of the
current tax system and combine to make the system an incomeconsumption tax hybrid.
Viewing the tax system as a modified consumption tax system,
none of these so-called timing preferences for business and investment
expenditures are preferences at all.
Rather, under a pure
consumption tax model, they should be deductible immediately and
never capitalized. Any deviation from this treatment would constitute
a penalty.
Accelerated deductions short of complete write-offs would be
perfectly permissible under a hybrid system. That treatment is
consumption tax oriented because it allows faster deductions than
those allowable under a pure income tax, but lesser deductions than
would be allowable under a cash flow consumed income type
consumption tax. This hybrid treatment in what is a hybrid tax system
should not be subjected to any additional tax, because business or
investment income tax preferences simply reflect consumption tax
elements of the tax system. As such, it perhaps should be up to
Congress to make individual decisions with regard to both the proper
treatment of each of these timing provisions, without resort to a dual
computation as under the AMT, and the extent to which one or more
of these provisions may be used by an individual taxpayer.
V. CONCLUSION
I would suggest that income tax reformers should not view the
ascendancy of the AMT as an evil at all. Rather, they should embrace
the increased importance of the AMT, because it incorporates the
kind of base broadening and simplification for which tax reformers
have been arguing for many years. Indeed, they should view the
ascendancy as an opportunity to push for tax reform and be prepared
to incorporate the core principles of the AMT into the regular income
tax as a substitute for the dual tax computation required under the
current AMT. They should also propose to make the resulting system
fairer, such as by ending the denial of any deduction for miscellaneous
itemized deductions, a provision that currently diverges from a
comprehensive income tax base. In any event, they should not now
surrender the prospect of income tax reform by eliminating the AMT,
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as the four former Commissioners and the American Bar Association
122
without securing some base broadening,
have recommended,
because to do so would set income tax reform backwards and forgo
substantial revenue for the government.
Provisions in the current AMT seeking to eliminate business and
investment timing preferences, on the other hand, should be
abandoned. While curtailing these preferences pursues the original
objective of the AMT in an income tax system, that objective is no
longer appropriate under the current income tax-consumption tax
hybrid system.
The reforms advocated above could have important implications
for the future development of the tax law. The foregoing discussion
suggests a “back to the future” approach to tax policy and a revival of
the base broadening and flat rates enacted under the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. The abandonment of these principles in the years following
1986 gave fuel to the movement advocating a consumption tax.
Indeed, the incorporation of the core principles of the AMT into the
income tax is the kind of tax reform that may save the income tax
itself from the onrush of consumption tax advocates, whose major
argument (although not their only one) is that the consumption tax is
simpler than the income tax as a structural matter, and is far simpler
than the current income tax, which is weighed down with too many
special provisions and the AMT, which make it even more
complicated.
While the consumption tax advocates are likely correct with
regard to the structural elements of the tax, they are only correct with
regard to the technical complexities in individual special tax
provisions to the extent that the income tax cannot be cleansed of
these special provisions. Abandoning the duality of the AMT,
providing a large exemption amount in the income tax and a flat rate
tax on income in excess of that exemption amount, and eliminating
personal consumption deductions (thereby easing the compliance
burden) are the kinds of reforms that would counter this argument of
consumption tax advocates. The income tax would be strengthened
significantly if it were more broadly based and less complex than the
current regular tax. In this light, the adoption of the core AMT
principles in the regular tax coupled with the elimination of the
separate AMT would create a more defensible income tax.
Of course, incorporating the AMT into the regular tax will not fix
all of the problems that income tax advocates typically have with the
122

Kenney, supra note 2; Shaw, supra note 3.
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current, post-2003 income tax. Because the system is an income taxconsumption tax hybrid rather than a pure income tax system, the
nature of the hybrid will continue to be at issue. The issues that
involve consumption tax elements in the income tax will remain in
dispute, with income tax reformers seeking to reduce or eliminate
them, and consumption tax advocates seeking to retain or expand
them. A new broad based, relatively flat rate version of the current
tax, however, will make it more defensible against the attacks of
consumption tax advocates, who seek to replace the current tax
system with a pure consumption tax. As a result, incorporating the
core principles of the AMT, other than the business and investment
provisions, into the regular income tax instead of seeking simply to
abolish the AMT could ultimately prove to be a better strategy for
those who seek to preserve the current hybrid system.

